CALL FOR PAPERS (Deadline Extension)

The Concept

Debate on multilateral governance has resurged in the last few years as a consequence, among other things, of growing perceptions of the state as an inadequate framework through which transnational challenges can be confronted. This perception of the state is bolstered by the nature of the post cold war international system and the fact that many challenges that were once regarded as being within the exclusive domain of states now have significant implications for international relations. As a consequence, old conceptions of state sovereignty are being intensely questioned. Within this milieu, civil society formations have become increasingly vocal in their demands for participation in multilateral governance. They argue that no matter what new framework for global governance is designed, it can no longer be ‘another organization mandated solely by states’ (Mori: 2004: 157). These demands can easily be situated first within the context of a global political system that is becoming increasingly de-territorialized and within which multiple forms of identity, mobilization and participation; a good number of which operate outside of the state framework; increasingly gain currency. Second, they can also be understood by looking at the challenges being faced by the state from forces below it for reformulations of the structures of production and accumulation, and for increased participation in the governance process (Prempeh: 2004; Webb: 2006; Coelho and Lieres: 2010). Thirdly, it may also be significant to interrogate the deepening networks and linkages of social formations across national borders; what has been referred to as a ‘global civil society’ (Anheier: 2001; Keane: 2003; Tsutsui: 2004; Tsutsui and Wotipka: 2004; Clark: 2009; Reitan: 2009; Duffour, Masson and Caouette: 2010); as a way of understanding not just the intensifying demands of civil society for inclusion in what was an erstwhile state-based process, but also their apparently growing capability to ensure that their voices are heard and ultimately influence the outcomes (Speth: 2003; Aviel: 2005). While the nature of the contemporary international system appears to encourage the proliferation of inter-governmental organisations, little has been done to ensure their democratic accountability. As Scholte (2004: 211) notes, multilateral institutions have ‘included only weak, if any, formal accountability mechanisms’. Indeed, there is considerable confusion as to whom or what they should be accountable. For instance, should multilateral institutions be accountable to governments or to societies? How much freedom of action should career bureaucrats who run the day to day activities of these organisations have, since they are obviously free from the kind of democratic control parliaments can wield over national bureaucracies? Rather than clearing the confusion, the deepening of politics beyond the state has indeed heightened the competing claims of various social formations to ownership of the accountability of institutions of global governance. This accountability dilemma is further deepened by a legitimacy deficit that hangs over many multilateral institutions. It is within this context that civil society participation in global governance institutions has been encouraged. It is assumed that civil society has the capacity to mitigate this deficit and introduce a democratic and broad participatory component to institutions whose very make up appears to favour their exclusion. In places like Europe where civil society movements have gained widespread and effective prominence in policy circles and where many of their core ideals and goals derive from a historically appropriate reading of the social imaginary within the society, there is still lingering doubt about the veracity of civil society’s claim to mitigating legitimacy concerns in multilateral institutions. For instance some of the central planks of civil society participation in organisations like the OECD, IMF, EU and WTO are, in fact, acts of protest against undemocratic, insensitive and top-down approaches to multilateral governance (Fox and Brown: 1998, Florini: 2000, Edwards and Gaventa: 2001, Scholte: 2002, 2003). Therefore, at the same time they indicate growing civic participation, they also reflect the depth of institutional resistance to it. In the developing world however, the challenges of civil society engagement with global governance institutions, while similar to the conditions in the global north, is much more complex. For one, the dominant conception of civil society is derived from a largely alien social imaginary and therefore deepens the disconnection with the ordinary people. There is the suspicion that civil society participation, rather than mitigating the democratic deficit, merely conceals it, and, in the long run, deepens it. This is a critical challenge not the least because it is coming at a time that governance appears to be deepening at the transnational level and there are growing legitimate concerns about its implications for democratic aspirations all over the world. In the light of the above, we are looking for innovative proposals from young scholars that draw attention to the limitations of civil society formations as legitimating or democratising forces in global governance. We are interested in those that seek to provide critical insights into the role civil society actually plays in specific institutions of global governance, from the UN to regional organisations and of course environmental or even educational institutions. The proposals should relate to the following themes:

1. Civil Society in Global Governance: Theories, Perspectives, Philosophy

2. Civil Society in regional institutions like ECOWAS, AU, EU, ASEAN etc

3. Civil Society in International Financial Institutions

4. Civil Society in the UN

5. Civil Society in environmental governance

6. The future of multilateral governance

7. Concepts of civil society participation eg. civil society as social movements challenging the nature of global governance and civil society as institutionalised NGOs within global governance institutions

8. Democracy and global governance: linkages, rhetoric and realities

Eligibility

This book is being edited by graduate student(s); as such, proposals from graduate students are particularly encouraged. We would also be delighted to receive proposals from young scholars within 3 years of receiving their PhDs.

Contacts

Interested contributors should send proposals of not more than 500 words to iwiladeakin@yahoo.com on or before May 15, 2011.

You will find regularly updated information about the project on akiniwilade.wordpress.com

Deadlines

We will respond to all submissions by May 30, 2011. For accepted proposals, full paper submissions must be turned in by July 16, 2011. Authors who miss this deadline will have their papers removed. Other things being equal, we hope to publish the edited collection by March, 2012 at the latest.

Some Chapter Proposals were unfortunately deleted in error. I have not been able to retrieve them. I will be grateful if authors can re-send their proposals. I’m really sorry for the inconvenience.

Kind Regards,

Akin

CALL FOR PAPERS

The Concept

Debate on multilateral governance has resurged in the last few years as a consequence, among other things, of growing perceptions of the state as an inadequate framework through which transnational challenges can be confronted. This perception of the state is bolstered by the nature of the post cold war international system and the fact that many challenges that were once regarded as being within the exclusive domain of states now have significant implications for international relations. As a consequence, old conceptions of state sovereignty are being intensely questioned.

Within this milieu, civil society formations have become increasingly vocal in their demands for participation in multilateral governance. They argue that no matter what new framework for global governance is designed, it can no longer be ‘another organization mandated solely by states’ (Mori: 2004: 157). These demands can easily be situated first within the context of a global political system that is becoming increasingly de-territorialized and within which multiple forms of identity, mobilization and participation; a good number of which operate outside of the state framework; increasingly gain currency. Second, they can also be understood by looking at the challenges being faced by the state from forces below it for reformulations of the structures of production and accumulation, and for increased participation in the governance process (Prempeh: 2004; Webb: 2006; Coelho and Lieres: 2010). Thirdly, it may also be significant to interrogate the deepening networks and linkages of social formations across national borders; what has been referred to as a ‘global civil society’ (Anheier: 2001; Keane: 2003; Tsutsui: 2004; Tsutsui and Wotipka: 2004; Clark: 2009; Reitan: 2009; Duffour, Masson and Caouette: 2010); as a way of understanding not just the intensifying demands of civil society for inclusion in what was an erstwhile state-based process, but also their apparently growing capability to ensure that their voices are heard and ultimately influence the outcomes  (Speth: 2003; Aviel: 2005).

While the nature of the contemporary international system appears to encourage the proliferation of inter-governmental organisations, little has been done to ensure their democratic accountability. As Scholte (2004: 211) notes, multilateral institutions have ‘included only weak, if any, formal accountability mechanisms’. Indeed, there is considerable confusion as to whom or what they should be accountable. For instance, should multilateral institutions be accountable to governments or to societies? How much freedom of action should career bureaucrats who run the day to day activities of these organisations have, since they are obviously free from the kind of democratic control parliaments can wield over national bureaucracies?

Rather than clearing the confusion, the deepening of politics beyond the state has indeed heightened the competing claims of various social formations to ownership of the accountability of institutions of global governance. This accountability dilemma is further deepened by a legitimacy deficit that hangs over many multilateral institutions. It is within this context that civil society participation in global governance institutions has been encouraged.

It is assumed that civil society has the capacity to mitigate this deficit and introduce a democratic and broad participatory component to institutions whose very make up appears to favour their exclusion. In places like Europe where civil society movements have gained widespread and effective prominence in policy circles and where many of their core ideals and goals derive from a historically appropriate reading of the social imaginary within the society, there is still lingering doubt about the veracity of civil society’s claim to mitigating legitimacy concerns in multilateral institutions. For instance some of the central planks of civil society participation in organisations like the OECD, IMF, EU and WTO are, in fact, acts of protest against undemocratic, insensitive and top-down approaches to multilateral governance (Fox and Brown: 1998, Florini: 2000, Edwards and Gaventa: 2001, Scholte: 2002, 2003). Therefore, at the same time they indicate growing civic participation, they also reflect the depth of institutional resistance to it. In the developing world however, the challenges of civil society engagement with global governance institutions, while similar to the conditions in the global north, is much more complex. For one, the dominant conception of civil society is derived from a largely alien social imaginary and therefore deepens the disconnection with the ordinary people. There is the suspicion that civil society participation, rather than mitigating the democratic deficit, merely conceals it, and, in the long run, deepens it. This is a critical challenge not the least because it is coming at a time that governance appears to be deepening at the transnational level and there are growing legitimate concerns about its implications for democratic aspirations all over the world.

In the light of the above, we are looking for innovative proposals from young scholars that draw attention to the limitations of civil society formations as legitimating or democratising forces in global governance. We are interested in those that seek to provide critical insights into the role civil society actually plays in specific institutions of global governance, from the UN to regional organisations and of course environmental or even educational institutions. The proposals should relate to the following themes:

1. Civil Society in Global Governance: Theories, Perspectives, Philosophy
2. Civil Society in regional institutions like ECOWAS, AU, EU, ASEAN etc
3. Civil Society in International Financial Institutions
4. Civil Society in the UN
5. Civil Society in environmental governance
6. The future of multilateral governance
7. Concepts of civil society participation eg. civil society as social movements challenging the nature of global governance and civil society as institutionalised NGOs within global governance institutions
8. Democracy and global governance: linkages, rhetoric and realities

Eligibility

This book is being edited by graduate student(s); as such, proposals from graduate students are particularly encouraged. We would also be delighted to receive proposals from young scholars within 3 years of receiving their PhDs.

Contacts

Interested contributors should send proposals of not more than 500 words to iwiladeakin@yahoo.com on or before March 25, 2011.

You will find regularly updated information about the project on akiniwilade.wordpress.com

Deadlines

Please note that no proposals will be received after March 25, 2011. We will respond to all submissions by April 10, 2011. For accepted proposals, full paper submissions must be turned in by June 16, 2011. Authors who miss this deadline will have their papers removed. Other things being equal, we hope to publish the edited collection by March, 2012 at the latest.

Akin Iwilade

ABSTRACT

This paper argues that aid is based on the assumption that Africa’s crisis is a function of the mix between development policy and politics. Proponents of foreign aid therefore argue for a de-politicization of development to allow impartial market forces to determine the distributive and allocative character of state. This view is considered misleading. In confronting the development crisis facing Africa, the paper argues that foreign aid actually politicizes Africa’s development agenda. It argues that neo-liberal propositions for economic reform are in and of themselves political agendas. Rather than de-politicizing development, it promotes a certain type of politicization. This is a political agenda that de-emphasises popular participation and instead strengthens unelected development ‘experts’. Implicit in this argument is concern for the continued utility of foreign aid in undermining popular movements for democratization and propping up internationally popular but locally unpopular regimes. In demonstrating the linkage between foreign aid and de-democratization of the state in Africa, the paper examines the political process in five states between 1999 and 2009. These highlight how foreign aid has been used not necessarily to de-politicize the development agenda but to promote the neo-liberal version of politics. The implication, in the context of a neo-liberal agenda that thrives on its pretence of impartiality and the rule of law, is that the state ultimately loses initiative to unelected foreign experts and civil society. This ends up not depoliticizing the state but merely shifts the arena of politics from the public to an increasingly smaller group of interests.

Paper presented at the International Conference on “Politics Beyond the State: Transformations of the State between De- and Re-politicization”, May 26-30, 2010, at the Collaborative Research Center 597 on the Transformations of the State, University of Bremen, Bremen, Germany.

 

This paper examines the construction of gender identity and roles in the Media in Nigeria. It seeks to draw attention to the connection between cultural values and the gendered choices of the media. It interrogates the gender discourse in the context of power and disempowerment and situates this within the political economy of Nigeria and its place in the global system. By demonstrating the linkage between the nature of economic production and the problematic of disempowerment, the paper argues that gender identity is best understood for its utility as an agency of political action and mass mobilization. This utility, it contends, is however being appropriated by primary identities, in this case, ethnicity, to the extent that the gender discourse is subsumed within the contestations for power which is conducted primarily through loose ethnic coalitions in Nigeria. The media easily reflects this situation by making choices that demonstrate their immersion into the ethnic conflict and their conscious manipulation of gender identities in a way that highlights their ethnic character. This situation, the paper notes, has implications for transcultural communication. For Nigeria, the inability of the gender discourse to be couched in transcultural language reflects the salience of the National Question. It also highlights the challenge of democratizing Nigeria and of finding transcultural convergence in an era of globalization. In concluding, it questions the ability of the media in Nigeria to effectively promote gender identities that will be inclusive and at the same time recognize the organic evolutionary process of social cultures in Nigeria.  

Key words/Phrases: Identity, Gender, Media, Identity Construction, Political Economy

Paper presented at the International Conference on ‘Time for Medialization: Integrating Media and Trans-cultural Communication Research within Islamic and Area Studies’ organized jointly by the Berlin Graduate School of Muslim Cultures and Societies of the Free University  and the Section for Mediality and Intermediality, Institute for Asian and African Studies of the Humboldt University, Berlin, at the Hotel Seminaris, Berlin, Germany, April 8-10, 2010.  

Nigeria is an abstraction, a non existent phenomenon whose continued pretence to a practical organic life is a travesty of the science of anthropology. Without urgent and conscious effort, this lie is bound to unravel and create what Jeffery Herbst had referred to as the greatest development tragedy of the twenty first century. Cobbled together by the British in 1914 from the carcass of an Africa that had been mercilessly partitioned at the Berlin conference of 1884 after years of rapacious exploitation, and granted independence fifty six years later, the Nigerian nation still remains to be born. What exists instead is a conglomeration of mutually exclusive social groups with fixations on primordial bonds that drive them to violent civil conflict and deep suspicion. Hardly a perfect recipe for unity. The distinct lack of choice in their marriage is arguably a major basis for this state of affairs. No nation created by foreign fiat will last forever. Who is a Nigerian? The actual answer to this seemingly obvious question is No ONE! In spite of the self seeking rhetoric of the political class crooning the emergence of a thoroughly detribalized Nigerian, few people, if anybody of all, hold their primary allegiance to Nigeria . The fact that the political class feels the need to dispute so much energy on the advertisement of the so called detribalized Nigerian underscores the reality of exclusive social relations and it’s place in the dialectic of Nigerian development and it’s national identity. The promotion of nationalism that invokes in people the passion that encourages sacrifice to an abstract yet real national project is directly related to the depth and vision of governance as reflected in it’s ability to satisfy social expectations. Equally critical is the ability to relate history to contemporary realities and ultimately de­­­­­­­­­-essentialize the often historical attachments to conflicting modes of social expression. The absence of such depth and vision in Nigeria ’s history is chiefly responsible for the glaring inability to weld together the different social groups that subsist within the territory. The Nigerian state has responded to the huge diversity and it’s challenges for nation building. Most measures have however been largely unsuccessful as the widespread and re-current ethno-religious and political conflicts suggest. Unity in diversity has been painfully elusive in the five decades of national life. The obvious value of measures like the quota system, federal character and the like in creating a sense of belonging cannot be denied. However, its failure to move Nigeria towards the ultimate goal of sustaining national cohesion has ensured that the Nigerian project continues to face uncertainty. This undeniable failure and the dangers it poses to peace and stability in the territory and the West Coast of Africa necessitates a re-definition of priorities and the re-conceptualization of the exact requirements for cohesion. For instance how much does inclusive governance based on ruling class alliances and it’s top-down approach promote national cohesion? Does the mere sharing of public office by the geopolitical zones without the requisite grass root integration advance the cause of cohesion? A conceptual treatment of the challenges of Nigeria’s nation building exposes the failure of the stop gap measures being used by the Nigerian state. They paradoxically serve to highlight instead of de-emphasize our differences. Federal character is only important in ensuring a sense of inclusion for the ruling class, it means nothing to the average Nigerian on the street and it sure means to nothing to the promotion of the real federalism. Far reaching action targeted at the cause rather than symptoms of the disease of social cohesion in Nigeria is required if a national identity will be developed and sustained. In the first instance, public education must be better founded by the federal government at all levels. The essence of education in national development is first to mould the emerging minds so as to instil passionate nationalism that will create citizens for the future. History plays a significant role here and its value in creating a sense of national pride in one’s country cannot be overemphasised. To this extent, History and National Citizenship courses should be taught at all levels of education. Nigeria may take a cue from Germany where even aliens are required to take German language and History lessons. No nation attains greatness without pride in its past and the continuous drive to assert it. Refusing to teach Nationalism, Citizenship and history or infact indoctrinating nationals particularly the youth population is dangerous as the most fundamental basis of national existence will have been lost and the emerging humans left to direct their allegiances at anyone or anything within sight in a rudderless search for being. National icons and symbols must also be created that reflect the history and contemporary realities of the country. People need to affix their dreams to something that answers questions about their history and sense of worth. The drab Green-White- Green flag is no symbol, it means nothing. Ghana’s black star flag is a much more historical and stirring symbol that can engage and does engage the attention of Ghanaians and other people alike. Nigeria is by all standards greater than Ghana but its national symbols don’t show it. With our famed Manifest Destiny to lead a Black Race in which we are most populous and arguably most endowed, we deserve to salute a flag that speaks to these things. Where is our black pride on our flag? The current flag is a mere piece of cloth that lacks any linkage whatsoever to our history or the future. We need a flag that highlights our Pan African identity and our leadership of Africa. When stirring national icons are created the need to find a more worthwhile basis for allegiance will have been satisfied and the primordial allegiances will begin to melt away. In short, a new ethnic group called Nigeria will slowly emerge. Merit is also crucial to the development of a Nigerian identity. When spaces are allocated exclusively to women in political life, quota systems ensure that particular ethnic groups are represented regardless of merit, or federal character promotes a system of patronage and at times mediocrity, the business of national development will be inevitably slowed down. The irony of it is that these measures seem to either highlight the marginalized or domineering status of groups within the polity with disastrous consequences for national cohesion. They also ensure that differences remain within national consciousness and therefore promoting a Zero-sum political culture where the struggle for control has its fault lines in mutually exclusive ethno-religious groupings. Ideas and values will inevitably take backstage and mediocrity rules. Above all governance and the questions that arise out of conflicting ideas as to how to sustain the state must be resolved in favour of the Nigerian people. The resolution of social contradictions through good governance, genuine democracy, the rule of law, public responsibility and accountability is a critical pre-condition for Nation-Building. In a State where poverty subsists, where fundamental freedoms are denied and the people daily feel the pinch of a parasitic state, the struggle for the control of the few available resources will preclude the luxury of national cohesion. The people will be too busy competing for crumbs left by rapacious elites to bother about unity. To them the enemy is within not without. National unity and cohesion is a primary goal of statehood. Without this, the foundations of the state are compromised and the state eventually ceases to exist, except perhaps, nominally.

*This piece was written in 2007. It was inspired by the ruthless and desperate politics that prepared ground for the national charade called elections in 2007. It is reproduced here today to revisit the national question in the light of the politics associated with President Yar Adua’s absence and the transfer of power to the Vice President.

Introduction

 This paper examines the impact of globalization on modern diplomacy. It attempts to demonstrate the role of increasing transnational linkages on the nature of diplomatic practice and its effectiveness. Interrogating the various dimensions of globalization, the paper highlights how it has increased the significance of non-state actors and heightened both conflict and cooperation. It also examines new and emerging issues in interstate relations in the context of globalization and attempts to draw attention to how these new issue areas have affected the conduct of diplomacy.

In promoting a robust interrogation of globalization’s impact on the conduct of diplomacy, the paper utilizes comparative method of analysis to highlight elements of continuity and change in 21^st century diplomacy. It also looks at future trends in the light of emerging issue areas in inter-state relations and therefore attempts to construct an image of the future. In the light of this, the paper is divided into six sections, the first of which is this introduction. In the next section, we attempt to conceptualize our key terms. After this, the evolution and universalization of diplomacy is examined. This section effectively points out the universalization of the European state system and how its conflicts and tensions with other civilizations tend to highlight the fault lines of global conflict. In the next section, we examine the character of globalization in the context of its tendency to create new actors, undermine traditional centres of power and promote new issues. These are interrogated with a view to demonstrating how this peculiar character of globalization has the tendency to enlarge the scope and complexity of diplomacy. In the section that follows, elements of continuity and change in the practice and conduct of diplomacy are examined. This is important to demonstrate the tendency of globalization to both perpetuate old forms of relations while undermining others and of course introduce new areas of interaction. It also demonstrates the survival of old ways of diplomatic communication in spite of the widely changing context of international relations. The last but one section makes a brief foray into the future of diplomacy in the light of the likely changes and continuities in a globalizing world stage. The last section concludes.

 Conceptual Issues

This section is important for the purpose of placing our study within clear conceptual boundaries. For conceptual clarity, we will examine the two terms that are central to our study both in isolation and within the context of one another.

            Globalization

No phenomenon in the contemporary world captures this global political economy better than what is now generally referred to as globalization. It has become so important that virtually every social science phenomenon may be explained in its context. Jacques Gelinas captured the universal utility of the term globalization when he noted that it could be approached from several perspectives: as a system, a process, an ideology, a modern mythology, and an alibi[1].  In spite of the wide controversies surrounding the exact meaning of globalization, there are areas of consensus. Adebayo Olukoshi for instance identified three broad areas of consensus: that the last few decades has seen the intensification of the process of globalization; that among the key factors accounting for this intensification is the revolution in information and communications technology; and that these changes have compressed time and space in such a way that has been critical to the changes being witnessed in economic organization in both national and international climes.[2] These areas of consensus are however dwarfed by the very significant differences in the conception of many of the most important aspects of globalization. For one there is no consensus as to the promise that the process holds for states, individuals, groups, transnational firms, cultures and indeed ideological contraptions like democracy. There is also an intense debate as to the reversibility or otherwise of the system or indeed its desirability.

The controversies surrounding globalization are not helped by the very many contradictions that the process has spurned. For instance while it undoubtedly integrates the world’s financial systems, witnessing the movement of capital and goods across national boundaries on a scale unprecedented in world history, it is also advancing perhaps the most profound marginalization of states that have in the last few centuries remained on the margins of the international system. Even within the developed world that seems to benefit the most from the process, the distribution of the advantages of globalization has been skewed. Globalization is creating immense wealth and at the same time entrenching excruciating poverty. It is promoting the general adherence to the western neo-liberal conception of political participation and freedom- liberal democracy- yet it is undermining the very platform around which democracy must be built-the state.

            Globalization is without doubt a contradictory process that not only promotes new forms of interaction but also strengthens the traditional methods. It should be noted that it also challenges the sustainability of old methods of diplomacy by rendering them innocuous and irrelevant. With its growing emphasis on technology, globalization seems to also be widening the scope of diplomacy so much so that it makes significant portions of the populations not only informed but also actively involved in diplomatic practice.

Diplomacy

Diplomacy is said to be concerned with the management of relations between states and between states and other actors[3]. While this definition largely captures the broad outlines of traditional diplomacy, it fails to situate the conduct of inter-state relations within the complex dynamics of globalization. It for instance ignores the increasing relevance of non-state actors, particularly their ability to build networks of interrelationships and indeed conflict or collaborate outside the framework of the state. 21^st century diplomacy has therefore evolved to accommodate changes in the substantive form of diplomacy. It more accurately captures the tendency of diplomacy to focus not only on the micro perspectives of politics but also on the macro system wide paradigms.

For instance, the growing complexities of the international system have heightened the salience of issue-linkages in diplomatic relations[4]. This is a clear indication of the need to expand the conception of diplomacy in such a way that it takes into cognizance the complex nature of the modern international system and the adaptation of diplomatic practice to accommodate this new reality.

In an attempt to further expand the scope of his conceptualization of diplomacy, Barston notes that even though diplomacy is often thought of as representing peaceful activity, it may indeed orchestrate or facilitate violent acts.[5] The implication of this is that the conduct of diplomacy may easily be brought to bear on violent conflict. Indeed, given the fact that state activity in the international system is essentially geared towards the promotion of often mutually exclusive foreign policy, it should be expected that diplomacy can easily be used for both war and peace. The blurring of the line between diplomatic activity and violence is said to be one of the developments of note that underscore modern diplomacy[6].

In light of the foregoing, we may describe diplomacy as the management of a complex network of relations between and among states as principal actors and other actors who are increasingly becoming critical to the nature of relations, within the context of a fluid and rapidly changing world.

The Globalization of diplomacy

This section addresses the universalization of a uniform form of diplomatic relations. It does not ignore the unique contributions of the various civilizations to the development of diplomatic practice. Neither does it deny the distinct eurocentrism of contemporary diplomatic practice.

Diplomacy has existed in some form since political systems were constructed. These systems include but are not limited to the European system, the Chinese imperial system and the pre –colonial states in Africa.  

The globalization of the contemporary form of diplomacy in so many ways mirrors the nature of relations between the various actors in the evolution of the international system. Since the inter-state system in itself is largely a universalization of the European world, it is to be expected that diplomatic practice will be significantly influenced by the European value system. Starting from the treaty of Westphalia, one may look at key events in the evolution of the international system that captures the globalization of contemporary diplomatic practice.

The Independence of the US in1776 after defeating a major European power marked the first definite phase of the global expansion of the European state system. By the nineteenth century, the Spanish dominions in Latin America had attained independence, further expanding the reach of the European diplomatic system. The defeat of Russia in the Russo-Japanese war signalled the effective arrival of Japan into the international system and the end of its isolation   from the rest of the rapidly growing ‘European’ world.  The fact that Japan had also defeated a key European power was critical in the acceptance, however grudgingly, of Japan as a member of the ‘civilized’ comity of nations.

The Second World War and its aftermath brought immense changes to the diplomatic landscape. For one, it highlighted the inherent weaknesses in the balance of power system that acted as the chief framework within which diplomacy was conducted. It also exposed the unsustainability of empire and the imperative of universalizing the values of self determination, freedom and sovereign independence. These two key changes in the international system were further highlighted by the reconfiguration of the international power system to the point that Europe ceased to be the chief centre of international diplomacy. The implication of this was that, non European values, albeit with roots in the European system, began to assert their relevance in the emerging international system.  The independence of the colonial territories in Africa in the 1960s and 70s further expanded the scope of this evolving system.

The evolution of the international political system was not complete however until states like Namibia (former South West Africa), Zimbabwe (former Rhodesia), the Portuguese settler colonies of Mozambique and Cape Verde, and of course apartheid South Africa had gained freedom by 1994. In the contemporary system, the United Nations seems to demonstrate in the most poignant form the globalization of diplomatic practice, deeply rooted in the Judea-Christian traditions of Europe.

Globalization: New Actors and New Issues in Inter-state relations

Globalization has not only brought in new actors it has also introduced new issues in interstate relations. This has implications for the conduct of modern diplomacy. In the first instance, it increases the complexity of relations and the possibility of conflict. By forcing actors into increasingly smaller spaces, globalization heightens tension and makes diplomacy a lot more complex. It also widens the scope of diplomacy as it is increasingly difficult to clearly identify the blurred line that connects domestic to international affairs. The impact of globalization has also greatly enhanced the cross border relevance of many issue areas in international politics. Chief among these is climate change. It has also heightened the relevance of issue linkages. Climate Change politics therefore has Human rights implications, regional security policy has implications for democracy, good governance has implications for peace and stability.              

The new issues brought up by globalization include but are not limited to, Climate Change, Spread of Disease (HIV/AIDS, Bird Flu etc) , increased linkages in the International Political Economy, refugee crisis, terrorism and resistance, instantaneous international communication and travel, regionalism and the like. The pressures brought to bear on the conduct of diplomacy by a growing population of knowledgeable and actively interested public is also a critical new issue that modern diplomats have to contend with.

There are also unique new challenges faced by various regions of the world that are reflective of the context and patterns of relations in those regions. These challenges are often historically and geographically specific so much so that it is difficult to universalize the practice of diplomacy without qualification. In Africa, for instance, the spectre of intra-state conflict has had serious implications for diplomatic practice. It challenges the traditional dominance of concepts like non-interference and the inevitable direction of state security strategies towards external threats. This situation presents complex analytical challenges for both scholars of international strategy and practitioners of diplomacy. This much was inferred by Kidane Mengisteab when he noted that ‘diplomatic efforts have been rather ineffective in ending African intrastate conflicts’[7]. This statement reflects the need for diplomacy to rapidly evolve to develop the capacity of states to confront new and emerging issues that bear deep salience for development.

Intra state conflict in Africa has implications for the understanding of the diplomatic implications of other corollary issues like refugee flows, human rights abuses and crisis export. It also requires diplomacy’s recognition of the underlining salience of the structural foundations of African states and the fact that these conflicts largely reflect a crisis of state building that cannot be effectively confronted by a mere adoption of traditional diplomatic practices. In essence, modern diplomacy has to take on new tasks like nation building, political engineering, infrastructure development, and humanitarian interventions. All these were quite evident in crisis states like Liberia, Sierra Leone and the Democratic Republic of Congo.     

It is instructive to note that these new issues are a reflection of both the rapid advancements in technology and the sheer complexity of global intercourse.

Beyond the emergence of new issues and perhaps deriving from it is the fact that new actors have also emerged to confront these new issues. New actors include transnational nongovernmental organizations, multinational corporations, international organizations and regional organizations. These actors are largely new to the extent that their relevance has been enhanced by the very character of globalization. There multiplicity has also been intensified by the growing complex nature international exchange and intercourse.

            Globalization is also undermining the relevance of traditional actors like the state to the extent that it erodes spatial sovereignty and tends to promote pressures from both above and below that threatens the dominance of the state in the conduct of diplomacy. From above, international institutions, international law, transnational nongovernmental organizations and of course multinational corporations put intense pressures on even the most powerful of states and therefore easily shape its diplomacy. From below, grass root organizations, local civil society, labour movements, public opinion, the press, students’ unions and indeed the endemic tensions between and among these social formations tend to undermine the dominance of the state in the arena of diplomacy.

It is important to note that the rising profile of new actors in the conduct of diplomacy is a phenomenon that easily reflects the dominance of industrial neo-liberal values of capitalism in the post cold war era. Transnational agencies and multinational corporations have now become key centres of power so much so that they increasingly set the agenda for global interaction. The treatment of these non state actors and of course unelected representatives of sectional opinion as, as Zivtev put it, if it were ‘unencumbered and untainted by the politics of government or the greed of the market’[8] is misleading. In fact, these transnational networks often reproduce existing power structures and are increasingly controlled by local elites seeking to re-position themselves and consolidate their power in the post-adjustment era.

This point brings up the question of the implications of these new actors to the character of relations in the international system. For one, the nature of relations is critical to setting the context for diplomatic practice. It highlights the diplomatic options available for all stake holders in a given situation and easily determines the overall effectiveness or otherwise of those options. Where the patterns of relation are dependent, states are likely to lose in their attempts to protect their interests, at times even their core interests. States like Iraq and Afghanistan are cases in point. To the extent that the nature of relations determines the relative power positions of states in the international system, it must be said that it has serious implications for the conduct of diplomacy.

      Continuity and Change in the practice and conduct of 21^st century diplomacy

There are elements of both continuity and change in the conduct of 21^st century diplomacy. It must be noted that change is more obvious in the international context within which diplomacy is conducted than in its actual conduct. Changes in the international system have been profound in the last few decades. For one, there are a multiplicity of actors that play significant roles in the conceptualization and pursuit of diplomatic policy. These actors are both constrained and aided by the tools of modern statecraft. For instance, there is a growing pool of highly skilled personnel that makes diplomacy an increasingly specialized vocation. The developments in technology also make communication across a broad spectrum of social formations quite possible. This may be both an opportunity and a disadvantage for actors. The issue areas have also increased tremendously.

Elements of continuity include the continued use of permanent missions abroad. In fact, diplomacy seems to be increasingly dependent on the establishment and maintenance of permanent missions abroad. These missions serve both symbolic and functional purposes. While the use of permanent diplomatic missions no doubt predates the contemporary era of globalization, they have taken on heightened relevance particularly in the light of increasing international travel and the need to offer consular services. The national security implications of international travel and migration is further heightening the relevance of permanent missions abroad and broadening the scope of their work.

The central goal of diplomacy still remains the advancement of national interest. This continues into the globalization era and in spite of the growing challenge to state authority by transnational forces, the state interest remains central to the conduct of diplomacy, as it has been since Westphalia.  

Other elements of continuity that can be gleaned in the conduct of 21^st century diplomacy include the fact that heads of state still remains the key foreign policy makers; and states are still dominant in diplomatic conduct.

Elements of change include the increased relevance of the public in the conduct of diplomacy. Public opinion has become a critical determinant of foreign policy. Since diplomatic practice flows proportionally from the nature of foreign policy, it can be argued therefore that public opinion has a direct impact on diplomacy. The widespread anti American sentiments in the Middle East has, for instance, a major impact on the way diplomacy is conducted. It can account in large part for the belligerent posture of states like Iran and Saddam Hussein’s Iraq.

Another key element of change in the practice and conduct of diplomacy is the increasing role of non state actors. As explained earlier, non state actors have become key players in the globalization era. They have established complex networks of linkages and control that make their interests increasingly central to policy formulation. In fact, they at times act as agents or representatives of states in their relations with one another[9]. The implications of this for diplomacy are immense. It intensifies the complexity of diplomacy while at the same time making it less visible and perhaps even more open to manipulation by social forces with vested interests.

Other elements of change include increased use of summit diplomacy the increased ability of relatively small powers to bring issues of interest into global debate, growing possibilities for cooperation and conflict, relevance of regime complexes, and macro perspective of the world, growing homogenization of economic ideology and the increasing visibility for non strategic issues like health policy and democratization.

 Globalization and the future of diplomacy

The globalization era is still rapidly unfolding. It may therefore be difficult to say for sure what diplomacy may look like in the next few decades. One may however safely predict that tensions will continue to rise along the fault lines defined by cultural civilizations as a consequence of the tendency of globalization to deny the specificities of relatively weak regions. Diplomacy will therefore have to focus increasingly on proactive measures to forestall the degeneration into armed conflict. Diplomacy is also likely to have to evolve to reflect the increasing salience of non state actors. For instance, diplomats will have to learn how to negotiate with highly irregular foes like terrorists. Economic matters will also likely increase in relevance. There is also the possibility that multilateral diplomacy, to accommodate the increasing cosmopolitan character of the international political system, will become much more important in the coming period. Above all, diplomacy in the era of globalization will inevitably mirror the very many contradictions of the period. It will create new areas of conflict and at the same time improve cooperation.

Conclusion

Globalization has not only changed the context within which diplomacy is conducted, it has also had significant impact on the way diplomacy is conducted. What this paper has done is to look at the various components of globalization and attempt to situate the 21^st century conduct of diplomacy within its context.

It has shown that diplomacy cannot be abstracted from its social and industrial base. The context of international political economy therefore plays a critical role in constructing the nature of diplomatic relations. Since globalization continuously modifies the character of relations in the international system, there can be no over emphasis in the assertion that globalization impacts on the conduct and practice of 21^st century diplomacy.

References

Adebayo Olukoshi (2004), Globalization, Equity and Development: Some Reflections on the African Experience, Ibadan Journal of Social Sciences, Vol.2, No. 1, pp 23-42

Jacques Gelinas (2003), Juggernaut Politics: Understanding Predatory Globalization, Zed Books: London

Kidane Mengisteab (2004), Africa’s Intrastate Conflicts: The Relevance and Limitations of Diplomacy, African Issues, Vol. 31, Nos. 1 and 2, pp 25-39 

Morgan Clifton (1990), Issue Linkages in International Crisis Bargaining, American Journal of Political Science, Vol.34, No.2, pp311-33

R. P Barston (1996), Modern Diplomacy, London: Longman

Zivtev L. (1991), Doing Good: The Australian NGO Community, North Stanley NSW: Allen and Unwin

[2] See Adebayo Olukoshi (2004), Globalization, Equity and Development: Some Reflections on the African Experience, Ibadan Journal of Social Sciences, Vol.2, No. 1, pp 23-42

[3] See R. P Barston (1996), Modern Diplomacy, London: Longman, p.1

[4] See an analysis of the concept of issue Linkages and Regime Complexes in Morgan Clifton (1990), Issue Linkages in International Crisis Bargaining, American Journal of Political Science, Vol.34, No.2, pp311-33

[5] See Barston, op. cit., p.1

[6] ibid

[7] See Kidane Mengisteab (2004), Africa’s Intrastate Conflicts: The Relevance and Limitations of Diplomacy, African Issues, Vol. 31, Nos. 1 and 2, p. 27

[8] See Zivtev L. (1991), Doing Good: The Australian NGO Community, North Stanley NSW: Allen and Unwin

 [9] See for instance the role of ITT in the Overthrow of the Government of Salvador Allende of Chile

Introduction

This paper addresses the nexus between politics and economy. It consists of four interlinked sections, the first of which is this introduction. In the next section, we will briefly construct a historical and theoretical context of the social science methodology for examining society. This should show how politics and economy grew to be separate fields of enquiry and why there seems to be resurgence. In the next section, we will highlight some key areas, using examples that demonstrate the nexus between politics and economy. After this, we will attempt to briefly look at the changes in the methodology of social science research and how it reflects the resurgence of the knowledge of the inextricable linkage between politics and economy. The last section concludes.

Historical and Theoretical Context

There was considerable debate in the twentieth century as regards the connection between politics and economy. Spero for instance notes that while the interaction of politics and economics is an old theme in international relations, by the late twentieth century, the study of international political economy had been neglected and; in analysis and theory, the two broad issue areas had been separated.[1]

This separation of politics from economics in the twentieth century can be explained in the context of the ideological rivalry that characterized the cold war. The liberal strand of social science research, with its tendency to deify market forces, played a significant role in promoting a view of economy that denied the political context. In an attempt to emphasise the capacity of the market economy to function effectively on its own, liberal economists tended to ignore the salience of the political framework in constructing the environment within which market forces operate.

Before the twentieth century separation of these two fields of enquiry however, scholars have traced the roots of the political economy approach to seventeenth century mercantilist theories[2] and for some, even as far back as the sixteenth century age of the physiocrats[3]. For industrial capitalism, around which the modern conception of the nexus of economics and politics emerged, the earliest origins may as well be traced to Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations. This is important because Adam Smith’s work pioneered the focus of political economy on industrial capitalism. By making the division of labour and exchange such an important organizing concept of his analysis, he took a comprehensive view of the production process. This was important because it aided him to identify the emerging classes and the implications of the nature of their relations for politics. This tendency to place issues of production and distribution of wealth in broad social context was further advanced by the works of scholars like David Ricardo and John Miller[4] who showed concern about the increasing tension between owners of capital and the working class.

As capitalism developed and its class contradictions deepened, scholars tended to become preoccupied not with understanding capitalism but with justifying it. This led to what Rubin described as the vulgar phase of capitalism[5]. By the 19^th century, scholars increasingly focussed on narrower areas of social science enquiry[6] and the gradual separation of economy from politics, in analysis and theory, if not in practice, began to surface.

The writings of Karl Marx emerged out of these contradictions and they seem to sign post the quintessential scientific interrogation of the nexus of politics and economy. The relevance of this approach to the study of society was underscored by the amount of opposition it generated from the liberal academia.

The decades immediately after Marx, the twentieth century, were critical to the eventual emergence of this separation. Joan Spero[7] notes the key issues involved in this divorce of politics and economy quite clearly when she identified the influence of liberalism; the construction of an international economic system in both the east and the west to which new states had little choice but to comply and which reduced economic conflict and the emergence of the cold war and its preoccupation with strategic and security issues.  

Since the 1970s however, there has been a resurgence in the tendency to interrogate society from a political economy perspective. Implicit in this re-emergence is the realization of the critical nexus between politics and economy. Indeed, failures in both the economic and social spheres have tended to highlight the need to initiate comprehensive reform of the international economy. This reform can however not be done without politics. By the time the new states in the third world started emerging and asserting their nominal independence in the system, the movement for reform had intensified significantly. These new states faced relatively new economic and social problems that required fresh approaches. Chief among these problems was the crisis of dependency. Dependency theorists do not see much difference between politics and economy. Andre Gunder Frank hinted as such when he noted that ‘…historical research demonstrates that contemporary underdevelopment is in large part the historical product of past and continuing economic and other relations between the satellite underdeveloped and the now developed metropolitan countries. Furthermore, these relations are an essential part of the capitalist system on a world scale as a whole.’[8] The ‘other relations’ referred to here are unambiguous. They refer to political and social relations that set the context for the economy.

The connection between economics has been heightened since the collapse of the cold war. In the first place, the ideological frameworks around which economic policy is made seem to have collapsed in such a way that a homogenous theory of development, capitalist growth, seems to be emerging. Indeed the international financial institutions of Breton Woods have gone through a process of transformation so much so that by the 1980s, they began to link issues of governance and politics to economic development. The conditionalities imposed by these institutions on many third world states were a signal that capitalism had gone full circle. It had returned to the classical interrogation of society through its political and economic framework. Conditionalities like democratization, respect for human rights, and good governance clearly illustrate the re-emergence of the policy focus that links politics to economy. Within the context of adjustment, these policies did not necessarily promote economic development as many studies have shown[9] but their failures do not necessarily reflect a weakness in the proposal for linking economic issues with politics. They infact demonstrate the dialectical relationship between them. 

The globalization era, with its increasing mainstreaming of issue-linkages and regime complexes in the analysis of society, tends to highklight the more the links that connect politics to the economy. In this regard, it is becoming increasingly obvious that issues like economic development being negotiated in the WTO has many political implications. For instance, it has implications for human rights, climate change, good governance anfd indeed democracy. The process of negotiation is in itself deeply entrenched in politics and diplomacy.

What the above shows is that not only policy makers but also scholars have had to engage the question of the linkage between politics and the economy. In the next section, we will look at some specific issues that further demonstrate this.

The Relationship between Politics and Economy

As noted by Joan Spero, students of international politics who have examined the interaction between politics and economics have not always examined the way economic reality shapes politics.[10] The idea that economic conditions are the principal determining factors of the character of political relations has however been quite popular with many development scholars.[11] Implicit in this theoretical understanding of the nature of social relations had always been a perception of economic conditions having primacy over all social relations. In the end, this perspective confronts society in a very broad historically specific context so much so that it establishes a linkage between economic reproduction and about all types of social relations man may imagine. From religion to tradition, this school is convinced of the primacy of economic conditions. 

In spite of this tendency to view economic conditions as being the most important, there are three ways in which political factors shape economic outcomes. In the first instance, neither economy nor politics can exist in abstraction. There has to be an economic and political super structure that sets the rules of engagement and that determines the nature of that engagement. In this sense, as Spero notes, the structure and operation of the international economic system is, to a great extent, determined by the structure and operation of the international political system.[12] Political concerns also tend to shape economic concerns. The political concerns of climate change for instance have significant implications for economic policies. The need to go green will entail dramatic changes in the nature of technology and indeed all factors of the production process. This is perhaps why the ongoing climate change talks at Copenhagen have not produced and may not produce any dramatic agreements. In and of themselves, international economic relations are actually political relations. Like international political interaction, international economic interaction is a process by which state and non state actors manage or fail to manage their conflicts and by which they cooperate or fail to cooperate to achieve common goals.[13]These three dimensions of international economics to a large extent sufficiently demonstrate the critical nexus between economics and politics.

Spero identified two principal political characteristics that shaped economic interaction during the mercantilist period. The first was the development of powerful nation states from the ruins of medieval Europe who focussed on consolidating their power both internally and within the international system. The intense but limited competition between these emerging centralized political units was also so much during the mercantilist period that the economic arena became the key arena of conflict[14]. The pursuit of power was thus carried out through the pursuit of national economic power and wealth. The search for colonies was also a largely economic agenda that had far reaching political ramifications even outside Europe.

Beyond merely shaping economic systems, political factors also influence economic policies. The sighting for instance of a petroleum refinery in Kaduna in northern Nigeria, hundreds of miles away from the oil rich Niger Delta region cannot be understood rationally in economics except if viewed through the prism of politics. On a broader spectrum, the aid policies of key donor states tend to reflect their political concerns and priorities and this has significant implications for effeciency[15].  Even transnational nongovernmental organizations for which a ‘doing good’ thesis of altruism is often constructed[16] have been shown to commodify their humanitarian activities[17] further demonstrating the inevitable linkages between politics and economics.

Finally, as defined by Donald Puchalla, [18] international politics refers to the patterns of interaction between and among states. As with all politics, international politics involves rule setting and goal seeking behaviour that largely determines who gets what. To the extent therefore that international economic relations involves the interaction of different actors in goal seeking pursuits that are sometimes mutually reinforcing and at times mutually exclusive, it is difficult to abstract international politics from international economic relations, or indeed any politics from economics.

 While the international scene easily shows these arguments, they are quite visible in the domestic arena too. To a large extent, the political relations of social forces within states are reflective of the character of economic relations. The state which is the main arena of political contestations ideally exists for the purpose of mediating the inevitable conflict that arises as a consequence of economic reproduction. In this wise, the connection of economics to politics becomes much more visible. 

How then has modern social science methodology evolved to reflect this nexus? That problematique is what will be confronted in the next section. 

 Modern Social Science Methodology: Primacy of Political Economy?

 In reaction to the failure of classic liberal theory to not only provide answers to the question of the rapid development of third world states but also to reduce the growing gap between rich and poor in the developed industrialized states, social science methodology has evolved resistance theories that encourage fundamental changes to the extractive and distributive character of the economic process.

 It is important to note that these new theories are significant in that they emphasise a reconnection of economics with politics. They argue that economic conditions bear an inextricable linkage with the political super structure so much so that a dialectical relationship exists.

The changes that saw the division of the economic and political fields in the examination of society did not only affect nomenclature but also affected the technique, methodology and value assumptions of the social sciences.

Literature in both the field of economics and politics have evolved to take for granted the linkage between the two. There is however a whole world of difference between recognizing the salience of economics in politics and actually engaging social questions from the political economy perspective. In a sharp critique of the former, Howard and king point out that:

The last ten or fifteen years have seen the beginnings of a crisis in orthodox economic theory. Rigorous, technically sophisticated and sometime elegant, modern theory is increasingly seen by both academic economists and students to be trivial, arid, irrelevant, methodologically unsound, and suspect in its political assumptions and implications.[19]

 This statement captures the broad outlines of the debate about the role that politics should play in the examination of economics and vice versa. It however reflects the existing consensus on the salience of politics in economics. The emerging challenges of globalization and the intensifying resistance to it is resurrecting the ghost of the ultimate tension between the political economy approach and liberal economics. We cannot say for sure whether political economy will become a mainstream methodology anytime soon. But recent events like the ongoing crisis in the global economy seem to be signalling an end to the Washington consensus of cold market economics. The bailing out of the various banking systems by the states underscores the unique place of the political context in shaping the economy. This may yet encourage a stronger resurgence of political economy as the preferred method of enquiry.           

Conclusion

This paper has examined the critical nexus of politics and economics. It traced the historical and theoretical context of the methodology of political economy and looked at key dimensions of that linkage. It also briefly examined the changes in methodology in the light of the emerging global system.

The above demonstrates the salience of economic conditions to the character and nature of political relations. This view of society presents unique opportunities that allow social phenomena to be explained through the all pervasive process of economic reproduction. It is safe to assume that politics and economics will remain inextricably linked far into human evolution.

 References

Ake Claude (1981), A Political Economy of Africa, Lagos: Longman

Bangura Yusuff (1992) ‘Authoritarian Rule and Democracy in Africa: A Theoretical Discourse’, In: Gibbon P. et al (eds). Authoritarianism, Democracy and Adjustment: The Politics of Economic Reform in Africa, Uppsala: The Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, pp 39-82

Cooley A. and Ron J. (2002). The NGO Scramble: Organizational Insecurity and the Political Economy of Transnational Action, International Security, Vol. 27, No. 1, pp 5-39

Fisher W. (1997). “Doing Good? The Politics and Anti-politics of NGO Practices”, Annual Review of Anthropology, Vol. 26, pp 439-64

Fox Jonathan (2000). “Civil Society and Political Accountability: Propositions for Discussion” , Working Paper, Notre Dame, In: Hellen Kelloggs Institute for International Studies, University of Notre Dame

Frank Andre Gunder (1972), The Development of Underdevelopment, In: Cockcfrot James et. al (eds.) Dependence and Underdevelopment. New York: Anchor Books, 1972

Howard M.C and King J.E (1975), The Political Economy of Marx, London: Longman 

Ihonvbere Julius (ed.) (1989), The Political Economy of Crisis and Underdevelopment in Africa: Selected Works of Claude Ake, Lagos: JAD Publishers

Jevon William (1871), Theory of Political Thought, London: Sage

Lenin Vladimir (1984), Imperialism, The Highest Stage of Capitalism, Progress Publishers: Moscow

Maren M.  (1997). The Road to Hell: The Ravaging Effects of Foreign Aid and International Charity, New York: Free Press

Maurice Dobb (1937), Political Economy and Capitalism, Longman: London ; Claude Ake

Onimode Bade (1985), An Introduction to Marxist Political Economy, London: Zed Books

Puchalla Donald (1971), International Politics Today, New York: Dodd Mead

Rubin Isaac, A History of Economic Thought

Spero Joan (1977), The Politics of International Economic Relations, London: George Allen and Unwin

[2] Ibid, p.1

[3] See Julius Ihonvbere (ed.) (1989), The Political Economy of Crisis and Underdevelopment in Africa: Selected Works of Claude Ake, Lagos: JAD Publishers, p.29

[4] Ibid, p.29-30

[5] See Isaac Rubin, A History of Economic Thought, p.381

[6] See for instance William Jevon (1871), Theory of Political Thought

[7] Joan Spero (1977), op.cit, p. 1

[8] See Andre Gunder Frank (1972), The Development of Underdevelopment, In: Cockcfrot James et. al (eds.) Dependence and Underdevelopment. New York: Anchor Books, 1972, p. 3.

[9] See for instance Yusuff Bangura (1992) ‘Authoritarian Rule and Democracy in Africa: A Theoretical Discourse’, In: Gibbon P. et al (eds). Authoritarianism, Democracy and Adjustment: The Politics of Economic Reform in Africa, Uppsala: The Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, pp 39-82

[10] See Joan Spero, op.cit, p.4

[11] See for instance Maurice Dobb (1937), Political Economy and Capitalism, Longman: London ; Claude Ake (1981), A Political Economy of Africa, Lagos: Longman, Vladimir Lenin(1984), Imperialism, The Highest Stage of Capitalism, Progress Publishers: Moscow and  Bade Onimode (1985), An Introduction to Marxist Political Economy, London: Zed Books

[12] Joan Spero, op.cit., p.4

[13] Ibid

[14] Ibid,p.5

[15] See for instance M. Maren (1997). The Road to Hell: The Ravaging Effects of Foreign Aid and International Charity, New York: Free Press

[16] See for instance Fisher W. (1997). “Doing Good? The Politics and Anti-politics of NGO Practices”, Annual Review of Anthropology, Vol. 26, pp 439-64

[17] See Cooley A. and Ron J. (2002). The NGO Scramble: Organizational Insecurity and the Political Economy of Transnational Action, International Security, Vol. 27, No. 1, pp 5-39;  Fox Jonathan (2000). “Civil Society and Political Accountability: Propositions for Discussion” , Working Paper, Notre Dame, In: Hellen Kelloggs Institute for International Studies, University of Notre Dame

[18] Donald Puchalla (1971), International Politics Today, New York: Dodd Mead, p.1

[19] See M.C Howard and King J.E (1975), The Political Economy of Marx, London: Longman

HIV/AIDS undermines development in Africa. While its medical ramifications are severe, the developmental impact of the disease is perhaps its most challenging feature. This is because its contemporary and historical context is a product of patterns of economic relations that have characteristically promoted dysfunctional reproduction processes and hence severe socio-economic pressures in the most vulnerable regions of the world. As Roy Love (2004:640) noted, HIV/AIDS strikes at the very heart of the production process and its impact on everyday economic activity is profound. Many other scholars have also established the linkage between AIDS and development. They consider it, in Nana Poku’s words, as fundamentally eroding the continent’s already fragile capacity for development (see Poku, 2001; Collins and Rau, 2000). The UNDP corroborates this view in a study of HIV/AIDS in Nigeria’s oil delta when it noted that the disease erodes human capacity, which is a building block for development by raising attrition among farmers, teachers and other groups to rates that cannot be managed (UNDP, 2006:93). Tracing the historical context and dynamics of the AIDS crisis in Africa, Love (2004:646) goes on further to argue that its appearance and rapid spread in many parts of the continent coincides with major changes in the structure and dynamics of international capitalism and has therefore impacted on land use, the composition of the labour market and affects both extra household and intra household relationships.

Perhaps the most salient aspect of the political economy of AIDS is the role the character and nature of material relations plays in its spread and intensification. This is so because poverty not only increases vulnerability to infection, it also diminishes the capacity of both the individual and the state to confront its implications. As Poku (2001) put it, poverty structures not only the contours of the pandemic but also the outcome once an individual is sick with complications of HIV infection. This condition promotes a cycle where poverty leads to HIV/AIDS and vice versa.

The purpose of this section is to situate the HIV/AIDS crisis in the political economy of Africa. In doing this, we will address how the character of the African economy in both its post colonial and globalized contexts encourages the spread, intensification and destructive scope of AIDS.

The impact of AIDS in the most affected communities has been severe. UNAIDS (2004)  noted that in countries like South Africa, Botswana, Zambia and Lesotho where prevalence is as high as 20 percent of the adult population, there is a reduction of between 1 and 2 percent in the annual GDP growth rate. Gaigbe-Togbe and Weinberger’s (2003:1) description of AIDS as being the deadliest epidemic in continental history and also a major demographic, humanitarian and development crisis very aptly captures the current conditions in Africa. It is however likely to have more validity if its future trends and dynamics are factored in. For instance, the United Nations Population Division noted in its 2002 population projections that between 1995 and 2025, a period of 30 years, Africa’s population will rise by 380 million ( a 63.01  percent increase). This massive demographic explosion would however have been higher if the impact of AIDS was not deliberately factored in. in that report, 16 million more people would have been alive were it not for AIDS. Average life expectancy has already fallen by 10years in the most affected countries and the average life expectancy in the 1995-2000 period dropped to 47years from 53 years due to AIDS. By the 2020-2025 period, life expectancy is projected to reach a mere 52years, or 10 years less than could be otherwise projected but for AIDS (Report cited in UNDP, 2006: 96). Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) also suffers as a study by the International Labour Organization has shown. It falls by 0.4 percent per year of life lost due to AIDS (See The Punch, Wednesday, December 7, 2005).

The grim statistics regularly presented of HIV/AIDS lends itself to the tendency to interrogate the crisis from a medical perspective or in fact from a much narrower human sexuality perspective. Such value laden views contend, as Yuichi Shiokawa (2000) of the University of Tokyo put it, that the AIDS crisis in Africa could be brought under control only if Africans restrained their sexual cravings. While one may dismiss such narrow and prejudiced conception of an issue so broad and complex as merely ignorant, the fact that it reiterates ‘the central thrust of prevention programmes and strategies over the past two decades’ in Africa calls for its challenge.

The political economy of AIDS has been constructed by numerous studies. (see Poku,2002; King, 2002;  Gaigbe-Togbe and Weinberger, 2003 ; Halmshaw and Hawkins, 2004; Love, 2004; and Canning, 2006). These studies have highlighted how AIDS impacts on the labour reproduction process, how it undermines human capital, reduces productivity levels and imposes labour casualisation, outsourcing and wage labour practices, all with the resultant dire effects on class relations and social structures. 

The manifestation of the economic dimensions of what is often erroneously considered merely a medical or humanitarian challenge has forced the re-conceptualization of AIDS in its developmental context. Former South African president Thabo Mbeki contextualized Africa’s HIV/AIDS crisis in the continent’s ubiquitous poverty in his opening address to the 13^th international AIDS conference in Durban in 2000. This view challenged the prevailing orthodoxy of locating the crisis in sexual behavior and ignoring the significant role that the character of economic relations plays. Mbeki’s political economy perspective of this crisis keys into the opinion of the founding director of the WHO’s global programme on AIDS who aptly historicized the HIV/AIDS crisis and concluded that those people who were marginalized, stigmatized and discriminated against before HIV/AIDS arrived have later become, over time, those at the highest risk of infection (Mann, 1999)

To be sure, this historicization does not imply value laden conceptions of sexual behavior but rather addresses pre-existing socio-environmental conditions created by the nature of economic relations that predisposes Africans to infection. This acknowledgement of what Poku (2001:537) described as ‘the synergistic relationship’ between poverty and vulnerability is not however to suggest that AIDS is in itself ‘a nutritionally based disease’. Rather, it suggests that AIDS, like any other disease, must be placed in the context of the continent’s underdevelopment. What defines that underdevelopment, is, as already noted above, the nature of economic relations in the global political economy. It is in the distributive character of the state that the privations that render individual’s vulnerable to infection takes root. As Ake (1981: 11) captured it, ‘the distribution of means of production among members of a society is a matter of the utmost importance; it is the foundation of the most fundamental inequalities, conflicts and contradictions of society’. He goes on further to establish the all pervading impact of productive forces when he noted that ‘it decisively influences social organization, culture, the level of welfare and even consciousness’.

The implication of political economy’s robust interrogation of AIDS is that all the dimensions of the disease are conditioned by economic factors. A population’s vulnerability to infection is heightened by nutritional deficits, by high risk behavior – through the commodification of sexual activities, the exchange of unsterilized piercing instruments, and the absence of quality healthcare to combat clinical conditions that serve as gateways to the HIV virus. The impacts of these are heightened by institutional, fiscal and democratic deficits that undermine the capacity to respond to the crisis when it eventually emerges. There is no gain saying that these causatives are created by structural problems in the production process that inevitably engender poverty.

The economic processes that reproduce poverty in Africa do not emerge in abstraction. They are a product of structural weaknesses in the political character of the state. The linkage this has to the AIDS crisis was well established quite early by Kenneth Sherrill et al (1992) in a study that highlighted the implications of the pandemic for politics and political science. In that study they noted quite aptly that it is in the third world that AIDS is most illustrative of deeper political patterns. The structural adjustment programmes of the 1980’s and 1990’s for instance, raised critical questions as to the ability of African states to confront the crisis. This is so much so because the reforms required severe austerity measures that inevitably diverted public expenditure from social services. The impact of these adjustment programmes on the capability of African states to respond to the AIDS crisis was further heightened by its timing. The structural adjustment programmes were imposed at the time the crisis was just emerging. This implied that political and economic conditions ensured that African states could not confront HIV/AIDS at its teething stage, before it required the huge funds it now does and before it had exerted such a severe demographic price.

Another important political condition that has ensured the reproduction of an economic environment that is permissive of AIDS is the persistence of tyranny. The authoritarian context of governance in Africa has had a profound impact on the mobilizational and organizational capacity of the African civil society who have been described by Halmshaw and Hawkins (2004) as the ‘glue that holds responses to HIV/AIDS together’. Civil society groups have traditionally been considered by the African states as enemies that must be crushed. This has prevented the development of the kind of civil society infrastructure and networking abilities that are required to effectively confront the HIV/AIDS crisis. The political space has been a flashpoint of violent contestation between the state and the civil society so much so that it has produced the unintended outcome of damaging civil society’s capacity for developmental interventions even when such is embarked upon on behalf of the state. It is therefore no surprise that civil society groups in Africa have largely depended on transnational donors to define their agenda and fund their programmes. The attendant legitimacy and autonomy problem has severely undermined their relevance in providing alternative developmental problems in the event of state failure. The democratic deficit in Africa has a causal link to problems like corruption, falling values and so on that have helped to construct an HIV/AIDS tolerant socio-economic structure.

Super imposed on and intricately connected to all these is the challenge of globalization. Globalization has promoted the cross boundary exchange of citizens that is unprecedented in history. These global population movements have become veritable conduits for the spread of diseases, including AIDS. The sheer rapidity and scale of international travel ensures that no single country or indeed region of the world can hope to effectively confront AIDS. This fact therefore imposes a global response as has been witnessed in the growing linkages between and among HIV/AIDS advocacy groups, multilateral donor agencies, states, and transnational and locally based NGO’s. Ironically, these increased linkages tend to promote the centralization of the response in a way that is often value laden and universalistic instead of context specific. Centralization inevitably concentrates decision making in the hands of transnational capital who have proven to be key drivers of the contemporary order hence commodifying responses to the crisis. Commodification in turn compromises the humanitarian imperative and promotes instead the geopolitical objectives of donor states and transnational capital. The fight against AIDS is compromised by the mere fact of its commodification.

The intersection of underdevelopment and the AIDS crisis in Africa raises therefore the issues of structural dependence, access to technology, control of knowledge and resource imbalance. It re-invigorates the challenge to global capitalism and its diverse contradictions and underscores the relevance of a holistic political economy approach to the pandemic. Gutkind and Wallerstein’s (1979:7) treatment of the political economy of Africa provides distinctive validation of this approach. They point out that political economy does not isolate the economy as a reified entity, distinct from other aspects of life. It is rather the ‘intermeshing of so called political, economic and social factors of change in one ongoing historical process’. Gavin Williams (1976) also, in justifying this approach in a study of Nigeria argued that:

There is no such thing as an ‘economy’ abstracted from the social relations through which men and women produce, distribute and exchange the products of their labour… ‘Society’ cannot properly be treated as a system distinct from the economic, political and legal system and interacting with them only at the margins. Society is made up of the totality of experiences through which men and women interpret their situation, define their goals and seek to realize them. {Emphasis mine}

It is in this context that we lay emphasis on patterns of accumulation and the character of the linkages, both national and transnational, that civil society involvement in the anti HIV/AIDS struggle in Africa both reflects and engenders. This is an option taken in direct challenge of the value context often assumed for civil society HIV/AIDS activities.

*This is an Excerpt from the paper, Democracy, Civil Society and the Commodification of AIDS in Africa, presented at the 2^nd Biannual Conference of the African Association of Rhetoric, held at the GSB Innovation Center, University of KwaZulu Natal, Durban, Republic of South Africa with the theme, Rhetoric in the time of AIDS: African Perspectives

Akin Iwilade

What has globalization done to the democratization project in Africa? Has it given strength to democratic reforms or has it merely become a useful façade for the democratization of tyranny? There is considerable debate on about every aspect of globalization. There is no agreement as to exactly where its conceptual boundaries should be or for that matter, its impact on social, political and economic forces. Increasing interest is however being paid to the implications of global interdependence, the revolution in communications technology, homogenization of values and the deepening entrenchment worldwide of market relations for the democratization project. Questions are being raised as to the democratic credentials of the democratization project being pushed by transnational economic and political forces.

The divergent perspectives provide important insight into the interaction of social forces promoting democracy within the context of a globalizing world of industrial capitalism. Scholars who see positive consequences for democracy do not necessarily ignore or deny the contradictions inherent in the globalization process that have spawned what Falk referred to as ‘exclusionary practices’[1] and Tandon[2] called the ‘logic of exploitation’. They merely explain and prescribe solutions to these problems within the framework of adjustment. They call for an intensification of the globalization process rather than its deconstruction. The logic is that it is the imperfections of the process of homogenization rather than the very idea itself that spawns the contradictions.

It is argued that the intensification and widening scope of the free market logic directly encourages political liberalization. According to Richards, for a private sector to grow, there must be free flow of information, transparency of state institutions, an end to corruption and the application of the rule of law[3]. In the long run therefore, economic liberalization creates growth and the level of affluence required to promote and consolidate democracy[4]. Huntington concurs when he notes that privatization places more economic resources in private hands, which in turn, provides more individuals with economic power that can be transformed into political power. He notes that the transnational linkages globalization inevitably imposes, introduces and solidifies the ideas of transparency, good governance and democratization[5]. Many other scholars share this view.[6] Another view is that globalization increases the demand of international capital for democracy. The reasoning is that business prosperity requires peace and political stability and democracies best guarantee that. The interests of international capital are best served by democratic regimes and globalization provides a platform that both deepens the need to insist on democracy and strengthens their capacity to pressure states into it.[7] A corollary is that globalization strengthens domestic institutions that support democracy because the market requires an enforceable and largely predictable system of property rights and impartial courts for it to effectively allocate resources in the economy. The increased involvement of transnational capital in the domestic economy therefore intensifies the pressure on the state to introduce and consolidate a measure of democratization and to popularize norms respecting the rule of law and civil and human rights.[8]

Globalization pushes the authoritarian state to decentralize power. As globalization deepens, states relinquish or in fact lose control over economic and social choices to market forces which are ‘inherently democratic’. The roll-back of the state ensures the entrance of other social forces into the political arena, deepens contestations for power and increases participation in the political process.[9] Similarly, Keohane and Milner contend that the intense struggles that result from emerging local realities of international market integration increasingly radicalizes the voices of marginalized groups and enhance the fluidity of assets and investment capital thereby intensifying the competition for state power and forcing democratization as a strategy for the maintenance of stability[10]. The state is thus weakened and authoritarian governments are unseated by preventing rent seeking activities and increasing the bargaining power of business. [11]

This globalization era has coincided with an increase in the number of countries that have had some sort of political liberalization. There is increasing devolution of power from central to regional and local governments that seems to validate the positive correlation of democracy and globalization. Increasing transnational linkages have also advanced the idea of a global civil society that contributes to political plurality. The thesis that suggests a positive correlation between democracy and globalization is based on the assumption that economic liberalization cannot be sustained without liberalizing the political structures of the state. These changes are understood as multi-party elections, respect for fundamental human rights and the rule of law. It implies an underlining economic nay capitalist logic to the global democracy movement that puts the interest of global capital at the heart of democracy instead of that of the common people whose development is really at issue. This denies the specificities of Africa’s democracy as was demonstrated by Ake[12] and effects the alienation and delegitimation of the global democracy movement from mainstream Africa. The interrogation of the globalization-democracy nexus by this school rests on another fundamentally flawed assumption. This is that the state is autonomous and is therefore capable of mediating the intense competition for resources by social forces within and outside it. The political economic context of post colonial Africa underscores the inability of the state to rise above class antagonisms. Instead, it is in itself a weapon designed by colonialism to facilitate the ruthless extraction of resources and therefore hardly attempts to generate legitimacy through democracy.

The political liberalization that globalization promotes is really not democracy in the sense that ordinary Africans define it.[13] It is merely the construction of institutions that aid the unfettered extraction of resources; that provide space for minimal but violently intense elite competition; and confers international legitimacy on the state while alienating it from the common people for which it exists. It offers a form of political participation which is markedly different from and, according to Ake, arguably inferior to the African concept of participation.

This has fuelled intense criticism of the impact of globalization on democracy. This criticism stems in part from the danger that it poses to the state. The loss of national government autonomy in decision-making due to the changing nature of global capitalism and the increasing power of sub-national and supra-national actors is the greatest danger to democratization.[14] According to Naastrom[15], democracy falls back on a community of citizens who are collectively self-governing. It requires a “people”. Without a clear notion of political community, of who the citizens are, therefore, democracy would be inconceivable. Rodrik also explains that the nation-state system, deep economic integration and democracy are mutually incompatible. He argues that only two out of the three could be had at any one time.[16]  No one however captures this dilemma better than one of the doyens of the free market, Thomas Friedman, when he noted that:

When your country recognizes … the rules of the free market in today’s global economy, and decides to abide by them, it puts on “the Golden Straitjacket”.  This is the defining political-economic garment of this globalization era. … As your country puts on the Golden Straitjacket, two things tend to happen: your economy grows and your politics shrinks. … the Golden Straitjacket narrows the political and economic policy choices of those in power to relatively tight parameters… Governments which deviate too far from the core rules will see their investors stampede away, interest rates rise and stock market valuations fall.[17]

Globalization undermines the struggle for the type of democracy that the African people believe in. The motive force of the struggle for democracy is the overwhelming power of the state and the possibility of its use for domination, exploitation and oppression. That struggle therefore seeks to control and harness power for the purpose of popular emancipation in the economic, political and social realms[18]. Without the power center and the resources it appropriates, the exercise of power is unknown. Thus, as the relevance of the nation-state diminishes, so does that of democracy. Ake argues similarly that with globalization,

…democracy faces yet another problem which is uniquely different and extremely threatening.  It is not a problem for democracy in the sense of redefining it in theory and practice or bending it to the service of specific interests. It is not a problem of appropriating democratic legitimacy for something else, or trivializing it or even rejecting it. What globalization is doing is rendering democracy irrelevant and in this it poses the most serious threat yet in the history of democracy.[19]

Globalization challenges national democracy and continually modifies it. At the same time, it encourage, at times actively, often times unwittingly, the challenge from below of state autonomy by NGOs and sub-state actors who increasingly provide services the state has been rendered incapable of providing, no thanks to adjustment, and who consequently command increasingly higher levels of loyalty. These multi-faceted attacks on the state are the products of forces that privilege international capital over the common people and who manipulate and mobilize democratic rhetoric to serve selfish interests and of that of the sub-groups who have become profoundly disillusioned with the ability and willingness of the state to serve their interests.

Globalization also degrades the concept of citizenship, which is an important prerequisite for a functioning and stable democracy. The global market transforms the individual into a common ‘Homo-economicus’ who cares more about profits than public and civic commitments. Individuals pursue their economic interests, disregarding whether governments practice democratic decision making. Since the public has less interest in the conduct and content of public policy, democracy gradually weakens.[20]

Globalization attempts to replace national democracy with cosmopolitan democracy. This is the type of democracy that abolishes the nation-state system as the key unit of representation and instead subsists on the normative premise of global citizenship with universal liberal rights and similar challenges. The weakness of this proposal for ‘cosmopolitan democracy’ according to Went is that it is focused primarily or even exclusively on democratizing established political institutions and/or building more effective ones on a global level as an addition to or means to regulate globalizing capital. [21]This is a problem because, as long as the market logic and the ‘discipline’ it imposes on the global system still forms the central motive force of democratization, capital will be privileged in democratization efforts and weak constituents like Africa will hardly have a say in the direction of the new order. This will merely perpetuate the same patterns of domination that necessitated a reconfiguration in the first place. Democracy on a national, regional or global form would continue to be restrained by strict limits set by the established interests of capital.

Contrary to the two perspectives of what globalization does to democracy, a third perspective argues that there is in fact little or no connection between the two. It contends that the extent of globalization is greatly exaggerated and that the world economy is not as integrated as commonly held. For one, most international trade takes place within geographical regions; multinationals typically have a home bias and most FDI are concentrated in a few countries. Again, since LDCs generally do not participate in the global economy, the effect of their economic openness should not be large to begin with and since the DCs are already stable democracies, globalization will not affect their levels of democracy.[22] The tendency to highlight the so called marginalization of the LDCs and Africa in particular from the mainstream of the global political economy is quite popular with writers on Africa. As Amin demonstrates however, the problem with Africa’s place in the international political economy is not so much in its marginalization but rather in the manner of its integration into the system[23]. We can add that Africa is not marginalized in the sense that the orthodoxy implies since its raw materials have played and continue to play critical roles in the global economy. What is marginalized is its productive capacity and its contribution to debate on how the system may be ordered.

Those who contend that globalization does not necessarily render the state powerless assume that increased openness is in fact a deliberate choice of states, that the state still wields considerable control over its economy, and that it still allocates resources to compensate for the supply limitations of the market. The adjustment era of the 1980s and 90s were not the deliberate policy choices of African states. Bangura and Gibbon agree when they argue that the ‘great majority of countries in Sub-Saharan Africa adopted more or less involuntarily programmes of economic reform designed by the International Financial Institutions (IFIs)’.[24] To argue that African states freely chose to impose those drastic cuts in national welfare expenditure that intensified social tensions, deepened the economic crisis and, perhaps more importantly, threatened and in some cases wrenched power out of the grip of the ruling elite is to deny very clear historical realities. The control of African national economies by multinationals and the IFIs is near total. In Nigeria for instance, the state can hardly claim autonomy in the face of forces in its critical oil industry. The same is true of Congo DR in its mining sector, Cote-d’voire in its cocoa sector and indeed most other African states.

It is difficult to ignore the evidence that globalization undermines democracy. The intensity of the crisis is particularly being felt in Africa because it remains the continent most vulnerable to the dictates of globalization. The African state therefore faces pressure from above that wants it to consolidate recent gains in the realm of liberal democracy and further entrench its economy within the global capitalist system. This however does not provide safeguards against the increasingly radical calls from below for a very different type of democracy. This is the type of democracy that advances economic emancipation, which redistributes resources and seeks autonomous paths to actualization. In the midst of this challenge is the developmental crisis that limits the state’s freedom of action and renders it extremely vulnerable to the dictates of forces determined to appropriate it against the common people. The crisis of development and the contradictions it creates is constructing a definitive pattern in the democracy movement in Africa and the next few years will be crucial.

[2] Yash Tandon, ‘Globalization and the South: The Logic of Exploitation’, International Society and Politics (Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung), No. 4:, 1997, 389-97

[3] A. Richard, ‘Economic Pressures for Accountable Governance in the Middle East and North Africa’, In: A. Norton (ed.), Civil Society and the Middle East, Vol. 1, Leiden, New York and Koln: E.J Brill, 1995

[4]  Larry Diamond, Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation, Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999, P.78

[5] Samuel Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century, Oklahoma City: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991, p.65

[6] Joseph Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, New York: Harper and Row, 1950; M. Weitzman, ‘Capitalism and Democracy: A Summing Up of the Arguments’, In: S Bowles, et. al. (eds.), Markets and Democracy: Participation, Accountability and Efficiency, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993, pp 314-35; Seymour Martin Lipset, ‘The Social Requisites of Democracy Revisited’, American Sociological Review, Vol. 59, 1994, pp 2-13; D. Held,  Democracy and the Global Order; H. Im, ‘Globalization and Democratization: Boon Companions or Strange Bedfellows?’, Australian Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 50, 1996, pp 279-91; N. Rudra, ‘Globalization and the Strengthening of Democracy’, 2005

[7] J. Bhagwati ‘Globalization, Sovereignty and Democracy’, In: Axel Hadenius (ed.), Democracy’s Victory and Crisis: Nobel Symposium, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994; J. Oneal and Russet B. ‘The Classical Liberals were Right: Democracy, Interdependence and Conflict, 1950-1985’, International Studies Quarterly, No. 41, 1997, pp.267-94; J. Oneal and Russet B. ‘Assessing the Liberal Peace with Alternative Specifications: Trade still Reduces Conflict’, Journal of Peace Research, No. 36, 1999, pp. 423-42

[8] J. Boli and Thomas G. ‘INGOs and the Organization of World Culture’, In: J Boli and G Thomas (eds.), Constructing World Culture: International Nongovernmental Organizations since 1875, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999, pp 13-50

[9] P. Self, Government by the Market? The Politics of Public Choice, London: Macmillan, 1993; D. Sheth, Democracy and Globalization in India: Post-Cold War Discourse, Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 540 1995, pp 24-39

[10] R. Keohane and Milner H, Internationalization and Domestic Politics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996

[11] S. Maxfield, ‘Understanding the Political Implications of Financial Internationalization in Emerging Market Countries’, 1998; S. Maxfield ‘Comparing East Asia and Latin America: Capital Mobility and Democratic Stability’, Journal of Democracy, Vol. 11, No. 4, 2000, pp.  95-106

[12] Claude Ake ‘The Unique Case of African Democracy’, International Affairs, Vol. 69 No.2, 1993, 239-244.

[13] Ibid

[14] Nicola Pratt ‘Bringing Politics Back in: Examining the Link between Globalization and Democratization’, Review of International Political Economy, Vol. 11, No. 2, 2004, pp.311-36

[15]S.  Naastrom,  ‘What Globalization Overshadows’, Political Theory, Vol. 31, No. 6, 2003, pp 808

[16] Dani Rodrik,  Feasible Globalizations, Paper available at http://ksghome.harvard.edu/ drodrik.acadmic.ksg.html, 2002

[17] Thomas Friedman, The Lexus and the Olive Tree: Understanding Globalization, New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 1999, pp. 86-8

[18] Okwudiba Nnoli, ‘Globalization and Democracy in Africa’ 2000, p 182

[19] Claude Ake, The Feasibility of Democracy in Africa, Dakar: CODESRIA 2000, p.29

[20] L. Whitehead, ‘International aspects of Democratization’, In: G Donnell et. al. (eds.), Transitions from Authoritarian Rule, Baltimore, Md: The John Hopkins University Press, 1986, pp 3-46

[21] R. Went ‘Economic Globalization plus Cosmopolitanism?’, Review of International Political Economy, Vol. 11, No. 2, 2004, p350

[22] F . Scharpf, Crisis and Choice;  R. Wade, ‘Globalization and its Limits’, pp 60-88;  P. Hirst, ‘The Global Economy’, pp 409-25;

[23]  Samir Amin, Africa: Living on the Fringe? Africa Insight, Vol. 31 No. 2, 2001, p.3

[24]  Yusuf Bangura and Peter Gibbon, Adjustment, Authoritarianism and Democracy in Sub-Saharan Africa, In: Gibbon Peter, Bangura Yusuf and Arve Ofstad, Authoritarianism, Democracy and Adjustment,  1992, p.7

*This is an excerpt from a paper prepared for presentation at the 21st Congress of the International Political Science Association held in Santiago, Chile, July 12-16, 2009